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INTRODUCTION Research Centres (IARCs) and the donor 
community. 
When Paddock and Paddock (1967) published 
their famwsbmk.Fmine-1975!  in which they 
descnbcd l n d ~ a  s r  hopelesscaw. Afrlcn wasnot CAN AFRICA'S NARS GENERATE ITS 
c o n s ~ d e n d  to have a food oroblem However. OWN TECHNOLOGY? 
while India now has several million tonnes of 
grain stocks, sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). formerly 
a food-exporting region has become a net food 
importer. The situation in SSA hss worsened to 
the extent that donors sn frantically searching for 
ways and means of  arresting what is seen as an 
impending calamity. 
The international community, spear-headed 
by the World Bank, recognizing that national 
development is dependent upon sustained 
agricultural development, has sunk several 
b ~ l l i o n s  of dollars into varlous sectors of 
agriculture. In recent ycars. the national 
agricultural research systems (NARS) of SSA 
have been the focus of t h ~ s  drive. Nauonal 
Agr~cul tura l  Research Systems Include all 
organizations - agricultural research inst~tutes. 
extension services, universities and colleges - 
with the capacity to conduct research, train 
individuals and/or extend results that are relevant 
to agricultural development. 
Practically everyone, governments, donors. 
administfators, policy-makers, social scientists, 
scholars on Africa, agree on the factors that have 
contributed and still convibule lo the African 
dilemma: poorly conceived objectives. 
inadequately trained research personnel, under- 
staffing and under-funding, structural 
inadequacies, poor co-ordination between 
research and agricultural development projects. 
poor institutional links, absence of incentives; 
multiple, unco-ordinated, and inappropriate 
donor funding, impomtion of non-adaptable 
technology. etc. 
In r a n t  y w s .  the documentation on African 
agricullural development and NARS has grown to 
such proponions that it occupies a significant 
portion of the world's b e s t ,  libraries. 
Unfortunalcly most of h e  existing documentation 
d e w r i k  the m e  scenarios and prescribe the 
same remedies, T h n e f o n ,  rather rhan give the 
classical Pnalytical dimensions of rhe role of 
NARS. I pose a question. In rhe search for an 
answer, I draw on historical evidence, present the 
umsuaints. s c c k r c l e v ~ t  parallels from India and 
by synthesizing these, I develop an action plan 
which ddrrrra the i n t e r r t i n  mles of Mtiwl 
govcmmcnu. NARS. I n m o n a l  Agricultural 
The answer to this question is a definite yes, 
but the evidence dates from the years before 
independence. 1930-1959. However. when 
viewed from current perspectives, and in general 
for NARS of SSA, the answer is a probable no  
with the following exceptions, Kenya. Nigeria 
and Zimbabawe. Several African NARS were 
etTcctive producers of technologies thaL were of 
benefit not only w i t h ~ n  their own national 
boundaries but servcd to enhance the agricultural 
production of neighbouring countries. Examples 
of such success stories come from Zimbabwe. 
Kenya and Zare .  
The Kenya maize programme produced high- 
yielding hybrids in the late 50s and early 60s that 
resulted in a significant Increase in maize 
production in the then East African Community. 
In Zimbabwe. the development of hybrid maize. 
SR-52 in 19M)isaclassic examplc ofa technology 
generated by NARS. Thedistinctive featureof the 
Zimbabwe story was that this hybrid was 
developed from local germplasm, whereas the 
Kenya case was a cross between a local variety 
and one introduced from Ecuador. 
Another example comes from Zaire, the 
Belgian Congo at the time under consideration. 
The success story of oil palm and rice research of 
the national agricultural research service. INEAC, 
at Yangambi in northern Zaire had far reaching 
effccrs on the oil palm industry in Nigeria. C8te 
d'lvoire, Malaysia and Indonesia (Eicher, 1967; 
H e e y .  1970). Ninety percent of the upland rice 
variety that is grown in Nigeria today is INEAC's 
O.S.6 variay. 
Other examples include the development of 
rust-reaislant wheat in Kenya, improved tea 
clones in cartem Africa, c m  in Uganda and 
Nigeria, groundnut in Nigeria and Senegal, 
soybeanandcotton in Zimbabwe,coconutin Cbk 
d'lvoire. sorghum in Uganda, coffee in Kenya. 
Zaire and Cote d'lvoire. cocoa in Ghana and 
Nigeria a d  pyrethrum and sisal in Kenya and 
Tanzania. 
While it  may be argued that the above 
examples come fmm Africa's colonial pan. there 
are NARS today whore indigenous resedrch 
personnel arc generating viable technologies. 
Kenya's 1986 food policy is today rm~tund to fwldpossibly lay theirhandson. The West Africa 
provide security, expon and home consumption. Cocoa Research Institute (WACRI) in Ghana 
to raise f m  income and earn foreign exchange. which had s w e d  both Ghana and Nigeria until 
This auuegy has been developed srwnd what is 1962 was dissolved and Nigeria established its 
defined .a seven essential commodities namely, own Caoa Research lnstitutc of Nigeria (CRIN) 
wffee.rtl.mnize.when~ h o n i c v l l d c m ~ ~ . m i l k  and WACRl beume CRIG. the Cocoa Research .  . 
and mear. Along s imi l i  lines, maize prdd;ction Institute of G b a .  ~ ~ l ~ . l a r e r  diversified its 
in Zimbabwe has uiplcd from independence in effort into ciher crops: coffee and kolanuts. A 
1980 to 1987 (Rohrbach, 1988). In Nigeria, in similar fate was experienced by the West African 
soitc of a reduced suwwt for research from the Institute for Oil Palm Research WAIFOR) which 
~ederal  Government:&rghum cullivars for beer 
production have been developed. Cowpea 
cultivars developed by the Institutes of 
Agricultural Research in Samaru. Zaria and 
Moore Planlation. lbadan are in high demand by 
farmers. Maize hybrids from the National Cereals 
R m h  Institute in lbadan are being widely 
grown. But the successes of today do not in any 
way compare with those of the colonial period. 
The obvious question is: Why are Africa's NARS 
not generating Lechnologies today? The answers 
lo thisquestion date from the period preceding the 
prescnt political and economic problems that have 
ovennken sub-Saharan Africa. 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES DURING 
THE POST-INDEPENDENCE PERIOD 
Many African leaders in theu zealous efforts 
to shed all vestiges of their colonial past took 
drasuc steps that dwuoyed the foundations upon 
which their newly emerging national status could 
have developed into nation-statcs. Nyerere in 
Tanzania abolished local government and farm 
coopcrruives in the 70s only to admit much later 
chat "thcre uc certain things I would not do if I 
were to s u n  again" (Nyercre, 1984). But af least 
he admitted failure in this respect and was 
inswmatsl  in reversing his decision later on. 
Nkrumah however scrapped Ghana's extension 
service and Sckw T o m  scnt the French packing 
out of Guinea soon after independence and 
plunged rheir countries almost a quaner century 
beck in h e !  But the ignmnce that wrs fostered 
by misplaced cnlhusirun in thc fahathus of Pan- 
Africanism is today surpassed by h e  shon- 
sighkdoa d some of Africa's kadcrs who fail 
to see indigenous agricultural research as a 
prerequisite to reliable food surpluses which is a 
prrcondition for (he developmeat and expansion 
d ~ ~ a c c t o r .  
witb iDdeptndmcc, oevml ~ u n u i w  vied to 
u u b l i i  as numy research institutions and 
~ t r o u m b o o u l l ~ ~ y ~ ~ s I h c y  
after Nigeria's independence became NIFOR and 
then later expanded its responsibility to cover all 
sons of palms. Both Ghana and Nigeria have paid 
for this by losing the oil palm md cocoa markets 
to Malaysia and Indonesia. 
The dissipation of Africa's leadership in these 
vital commodities was not only the result of an 
over-enthusiasm in the expansion of mandate 
crops. In NIFOR, thanks to Nigeria's crude oil 
boom, staff positions increased by 2000-fold 
betwecn 1955 and 1970 with two thirdsof itsslaff 
In administration! Most of NIFOR's budget is 
used to pay the salaries of its overwhelming 
adrninisvative slaff and research receives little or 
no funding. Similarly. the East African 
Agricultural and Forestry Research Organization 
(EAAFRO) was dlsmanlled after independence. 
It had bccome underslaffed and under political 
pressure from member governments. EAAFRO 
recruited fresh graduates and unqualified 
indigenous staff. The political turmoils that 
overtook the East African Community saw the 
death of EAAFRO. 
CURRENT IN-COUNTRY SUPPORT FOR 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH 
Most African governments have a biased view 
of the role of agriculture in national development 
and thisattitudeis translatedintothe weaksupport 
that is given to agricultural research. During the 
first 10 years after independence, governments 
placed emphasis on industrial and urban 
development, improving thc litaacy level and 
social services. At the lame time, thc political 
support for research declined, precisely when 
thcre was &need to invest in research taimprove 
productivity and incomc in diverse farming 
systems. Whik some support for cash crops 
(coffee. tea, cam oil palm, rubber and cotton) 
cmuinued. research on food crops received little 
a no emphasis except for come stnpks (cassava 
in T .aun l ,  rife and cezaava in Zaire and maize 
in Zimbabwe and Keoya). 
Ihe national allaslion to agricultural research and several others receive substantial funds fmm 
in SSA ranees fmm 0.1% to sliehtlv above 2% of donors for orrecumnt ex~enditures of their NARS. 
the agriculiural gmss national product (GNP). A 
mget figure of I% is considered desirable and 
~ 0 . 5 %  as inappropriate (SPAAR, 1987). In 1980. 
Mali. Senegal and Burkina Faso spent only an 
average of 0.91% of their GNP on research. In 
1983. the Government of Mali allocated $1.25 M 
to the lnstiut d'Economie Rurale (IER), which 
was only 40% of IER's budget to pay salaries of 
715 local staff as well as fund operational 
activities and meet recurrent costs. Burkina Faso 
allocated S7I5.000 in 1983 to the lnstitut 
Burkinabe de Recherche Agronomique el 
Zootechnique. Senegal did not set up a university 
level faculty in agr~culture until 19 years after 
independence (Eicher, 1986). In Nigeria both 
politicians and the military agree on one thing: 
that university professors are intellectually 
arrogant and must be subdued. The budget 
allwated to research is hardly sufficient to pay 
salaries. Less than 50% of Zambia's research 
budget comes from government funds. Only 
recently didTanzan~aestablish astate agricultural 
un~versity (Eicher. 1989). 
But in polilical rallies and government while 
papers, national leaders continue to emphasize 
agriculture as the "priority of priorities'' and 
encourage farmers to produce more food, without 
they themselves, providing the basic support to 
the research arm of agriculture. 
DONOR ASSISTANCE - BLESSING OR 
BANE! 
A significant number of NARS exist only 
through donors, although it is questionable ~f this 
is an advantage or a disincentive to self-reliance 
and development. A major drawback in the 
financial and technical assistance that is provided 
lo Afriu is that many are not requested by the 
recipient countries but are undertaken at the 
insistence of different donas and as such, arc 
often modelkd afm donors' perception of what 
the recipientnecds (Nwanzc. 19W. Uma Leleand 
Goldsmith. 1989). As a result. donors an paying 
f a  a luge share of the research budgcf in several 
Afriuncwnuies. Consequently several directors 
of NARS find it m i o r  and ~ r m  to donon rather 
than tbcir govammenu to obmin extra funds and 
govanmeals in tom nat mly  withold. bat refuse 
lo lappm choa o m  NARS until doaor funding is 
.asrsd Glunh W, Niga, Rwanda. Senegal. 
Z.mbi BurlriruFw. LW.wi. Lclolho. G m b i i  
The response of donors lo Africa's crises is 
unpredictable, but most probably conditioned by 
political affiliations. Dramatic food crises send 
donors vying for the "big brother" position in 
tonnage of food aid. In other circumstances. there 
is a frenzied response with a flood of overnight 
consultants and experts.ermpolating incoherent 
slrategies that are unfortunately implemented 
with little or no understanding of the problem. 
And some of these so-called cxpcns may have, at 
best, only spcnt a few week in Africal 
The number of foreign assistance efforts in 
NARS of SSA is often beyond the management 
capabilities of national systems. For exanlple, in 
1984, the USAID had approximately lDOO active 
projects in 35 counuies In Africa (Eicher. 1986). 
In Rwanda. the World Bank in one project alone 
endorsed research on 17 commodities. Many of 
these projccuarcnot integrated within NARS and 
they distort programme balance, especially when 
they cease. The often cited project efficiency. 
accounting regulationsand need for autonomy are 
of less importance to thc overall efficiency and 
existence of NARS. Several donors are noted for 
their short duration, over-financed projects (2- 5 
years), poorly conceptualized with misplaced 
objectives, large number of commodities, quick 
impact generating activities (buildings and 
vehicles), multiplicity of projectsat the same time 
and for the same NARS and unco.ordinsted 
support for the same projects. The obvious effecls 
arc that the absorptive capacity of NARS become 
oversvelched and their efficiencies diminished. 
Several NARS also recognize the obvious 
failures of donor-sponsored projects which 
donors themselves continue to fund and into 
which they pumpmillionsofdollm(Zurek. 1985; 
Cernia, 1985; World Bank, 1988; Eichcr, 1984, 
1988). Half of the Wald Bank's research and 
development(R&D)projeclsin SSA are known to 
have totally failed (World Bank, 1988). This isan 
unnecessary investment in inappropriate 
technologies. In Malawi, small holders did not 
adopt the new dent varieties of maize, because 
they prefer flint types for processing and 
consumption under village conditions. Dent 
maize ir planted mainly on larga holdings. In 
northern Nigeria. small holders did not adopt 
technologies developed far sole-cropping since 
they grow cereal-wwpcacmpmixaucs. Although 
donas are pumping millions i n o  Somali tach 
year, it is mlachieving Lbe objective of building 
the nrnionrl capacity of Somalia's NARS. 
But why dogovemmcnts continue to enternin 
such donor projects? They am prestigious 
~ ~ l y  whsn Mock and morur mcturcs  an 
involved. they cmate jobs, stabilize their 
economies, divert attention. and psrmit them to 
l i f t  hnds  into ocher s a m n .  But the antislimax 
is the negative impact on NARS. 
IS HUMAN RESOURCE A CONSTRAINT 
TO NARS? 
Many donors, African countries, expens and 
tho more than 700 research pmfcssionds in the 8 
Sahelian counuies nearly one third were 
expatriates. Similarly in COte d'lvoire, out of 201 
rcscafchers in agriculture only 28% an Ivoirean 
nationals. T k  others arc expahiate staff. This 
figure is topped by Moznmbique where 83% of 
agricultural resurehers .n expatriates. Very few 
of the national scientists and researchers in 
Sahelian West Africa have mining beyond the 
Ingenieur Agmnome Diploma. Less than 10% of 
the 531 national scientists have postgraduate 
degrees. This is In s h w  convast lo the figures for 
nudenu on Afncan ~&~~cu l tu ra I  reseaich have 10counvles In eas tmind  southern ~ f r l c a  where 
a r~ued  Ih.1 the overlv~n~oroblem ofNARS ~ s t h e  ln 1987. 1570 research slsff had st least a B.Sc. 
sh;ortage of well-trained staff (Uma Lele and 
Goldsmith. 1989: Nwanze. 1988; World Bank. 
1985. 1987: Eichu, 1986), although in some 
countries new agncultural graduatesareunable to 
findemployment (Rocheleau etal.. 1988). Butthe 
secming under-staffing in some NARS is also the 
mul l  ofan unrealisticattempttoconduct research 
into every possible commod~ty (even when they 
are not of suff~cient nat~onal importance to 
warrantany research effon)andan expansion into 
non-research areas such as plantation 
management. processing plants, distribution and 
sale of produce. Consequently, a large proportion 
of the already meagre research budget is used to 
pay staff salaries at the expense of the overall 
quality of research. For example, personnel 
salaries accounted for 80% of Lhe operational 
budget ofKenya In 1987.70% in Malawi in 1985 
and 90% in Nigeria in 1988 (World Bank. 1985. 
1987; FAOIWorld Bank. 1988). 
One m p r  consequence in that, not only is 
thcre insufIicient financial suppon for actual 
research. -h support swvices also become 
totally negkcted. For example, t h m  an very 
few, if any. well-staffed, well-stocked NARS 
libraries in Africa. Most libraries are unable to 
subscribe KI inrcrnational pumala, maintain u p  
to-date literature. let alone procure modern 
fuilities in libmy aimce.  Bmk shelves are 
either empty or slocked with 'latwt" issues that 
duc 2-10 yurs  ago. The sad result is that NARS 
sicntists arc W e d  to develop a "give up" 
atlitude and arc u ~ b l e  to intelligently discuss 
recent dvmccs in scientific resureh with their 
w e n o m c o l m ~ .  
W h i k h  isanacnushofi.geofexpaienced 
degree. ~ony-s ix  per cent of this number, which 
docs not include certificple and diploma holders. 
had either an M.Sc. or Ph.D. (Mukiibi andomari. 
1989). 
The issue is not only one of numbers, but also 
of quality. A good proportion of NARS 
researchers are inappropriate both in their skills 
and attitudes lo undeMke research which requires 
high levels of expertise and commiLment. In 
several counuies of SSA, returning home from 
overseas training with a graduate or postgraduate 
degree is still looked upon as the ultimate 
achievement and the acquisition of an assured 
position of authority and privilege. Few Africans 
recognize that there isa gestation period of 10-15 
years between the commencement of graduate 
training and the productive research years of the 
individual. WlLh this attitude, many are neverable 
to develop the ability to generate the products of 
their training. 
LESSONS FROM INDIA 
India's developmenl of its research 
orgaoiz~tion and the progress in food sufficiency 
is a clmsical example of what can be achieved by 
acornbination ofassured long.urmdonorsuppon 
and commitment from the highest level of  
government. 
In m v n s t  to Africa. at independence in 1947. 
India had 17 degree-granting agricultural 
institutions (Uma Lcle and Goldsmith. 1989). In 
Africa, there were few scattered colleges - 
Makcrere C d k g e  in Uganda. Yangambi in Zaire. 
che University College of IbPdPn in Nigeria. the 
University of Scimce aod Twhnology, Kumasi, 
indipcwut-ks, tcvat NARS arc ruffed Ghana, tk prclsnt University of Oham at Legon. 
bv e x a a i a t .  a k x r m h c d  lesl institied Nia*UnivdtvCdk~e.SiWLco~andBun& 
~~~& f& of NARS &archa ~ - k a ~ l I u r l l  ~ & l c g e  i; M h i .  Even then. oaly 
rsd suEf in P r a b h  of Apicukm in ~ k a i m  un ivc r t ik  had my r i p i h t  number 
Africa arc expaoiatc (Euba. 1986). In 1986, of of M.Sc. snd Ph.D. graduaus in the early 800. At 
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independence in India, there was already an 
inuiluticxl with a cnlibrr of intellectuals who 
m l d  u Lusc borrow from the international store 
house of knowledge and bring about an easy 
wander of bbornlory and field mults  onto the 
fmm. A good example of the opposite. situation 
ww in Zaire which at independence had only I I 
agricultural graduates! Other promising 
institutions such as Makenre University were 
dev& during intenul political upheavals. 
Even today, out of 28 agricultural institutions in 
the Sahel. none offers training to M.Sc. or Ph.D. 
levels (INSAH. 1984). 
The lndian govanment was also instrumental 
In encouraging its scientific sector and suppon 
wasgiven from the highest level. In contrast. lop 
level support for research is absent In Africa and 
this has hampered institutional development.A 
distinct difference bctwcen technical assistance 
m lndia and Africaafter independence is the close 
satisfy the political pressures from member 
countries of the Sahel. 
The Indian food crisisof 1965 wasacatalyst in 
thc increased suppon for adaptive research by the 
Indian govcmmcnund thecrisisover the adoption 
of introduced high yieldingvarieties(HYV) led to 
Ihcdevelopmmtof locally adapted wheat and rice 
varieties (Uma Lele and Goldsmith. 1989). In 
Africa, the food crisis has resulted in massive 
food aid and a disincentive for governments to 
sponsor and suppon agricultural research. The 
demand formearchand the suppon for enhancing 
the mearch capability which India has generated 
are lacking in Afriu. While it was the Indian 
government which invited USAID. Rockefeller 
and Ford Foundations,muchof theeffort in Africa 
1s the result of what the donors consider best for 
their recipient counuies. 
Three major lessons should be taken from the 
lndian experience for Afrlca. First, support from 
lies and long durauon projects that were fostered the highest level of government is required for 
bv the US Anencv for International Dcvelooment build~nn an effecuve caoacilv and caoabilitv for 
(USAID). Ihe ~ o i d  and Rockefeller ~oundations 
and the lndian research sector. 
Success of the long-term commitment of the 
Americans in lndian agriculture was gunrantced 
by their ~nvolvement in only major research 
projects. In collaboration with the Rockefeller 
Foundation, lndia embarked on adaptive research 
on hybrid maize. The success of malze in lndia 
though muffled by the net returns of rice, had 
spin-offs on other crops. Through the All India 
Co-ordinated system of research, sorghum and 
pearl millet made major improvements in the late 
60s. In Africa, the reverse occurred after 
independence. In Nigeria, with the oil boom in the 
70s and 80s. the agricultural sector which was 
responsible for over 70% of the country's foreign 
ewhange earnings was neglectedand both export 
crops (cotton, rubber. oil palm. cocoa and 
gmwdnurn) and food crops research was given 
very little or no anention. 
The placing of highly qualified scaff and the 
continuity in technical assistance personnel over 
& v d  yean in India are in conrrasr to Ihe short- 
duration t m r  and diversity of in-country 
expcricnce Ihu ia enmuraged by bilamal donor 
agencies in Africa. The USAID sponsored 
etcgmed R* f4mapMH (IPM) Projtcr of the 
lnsliltu du Sskel w u  rmadsrsd e wort m five 
cmpa - PI.ize. rice, awglmm, ptPL milW and 
~ o v p r ~ . 1 h i M 5 5 y S r @ J w ~ ,  
1988). Tk. F A 0  mctoild "experts" with a 
~ o l a p a i e a a r . I d i R ~ ~ ~ ~ ) , t o  
. . . .
science and technology. Second, a long-term 
commitment from natronal governments and 
donors, both in capital and human resource 
development, is a prerequisite for sustained 
development of NARS. Third, actual donor 
involvcmcnt in institution building across the 
three arms of NARS - training, research and 
extension should receive equal priority. 
AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 
From the foregoing sections. the obvious 
question that must be addressed by national 
governments, donors and NARS is: What should 
be done to strengthen NARS so that they can 
bccome marc productive in the development and 
utilization of agricultural technology? 
In earlier sections. I have discussed the 
pmblems of NARS in SSA within the single 
ccmtext of a region, occasionally highlighting 
differences between countries. zones and sub- 
regions. An Africs-wide strategy for 
strcnglhcning NARS is unrealistic and cannot be 
effective. An eftion plan should begin on Ihe 
baaic knowledge that NARS arc as varied and 
diverse in their composition, capaciliea and 
capabilities, performance polenrisl and viability 
u Africw nation8 tknlsclves. They llS0 
intlucnccd by the nalure of htemMbA pd i t iu l  
interem. A ma@y to rtnngthcn SSA'r NARS 
should fnatdMarnine which NARSun gcmervc 
tabnolopica (e.g. Nigeria and Zimbabwe) and 
which un adapt or bcrmw technologies. There 
are seven1 wunuies (e.g. Mauriunia. Guinca 
Bissau and Cape Verde) wben it will be totally 
uml i s l i c  to attempt la mount a research effon 
without the neccssory institutional capacity, nor 
the commiunent and political will for such an 
effon. The following saction should therefore be 
viewed within the above context. 
Action by governnunrs and NARS 
An undisputed premise for my  effon to bring 
about changes resides in the indigenous ability of 
a people to mobilize domestic political support 
that foster the developmental processes needed to 
generate such changes. The failure to recognize a 
problem preclbdcs any effon at searching for 
solutions. Incremental donor funding for NARS 
without malching budgetary increases from 
governments will not generate but deter 
improvements in agricultural research. The basic 
rquirements arc therefore: 
(1) National governments should allocate 
adequate funds for research and ensure timely 
disbursement and long-term provision for 
operational and capital budgets. 
(2) The demand for research must increase and 
this must come from farmers, both small and big. 
who are the primary beneficiaries of technology 
and from the political elite (planners and political 
advisers) who. hopefully. recognize the role of 
technology in agricultural development. This 
calls for rigorous and unrelenting canvassing of 
both interest gmups by research managers and 
scientists, whomust continueloshow proof of the 
benefits that can rccme from research. 
(3) An inventory of research needs to be 
prep& by commodities, disciplines, personnel 
and capital requiremenu. ISNAR's role in this 
m a  should be exploited. 
(4) Improve linkages between research 
slotions. utension services and farmers. Seek and 
e n c m e  f u m a  participation and feedback. 
(5) Enamabrlancebawcen cummoditiu for 
food security and income-generating 
commodities fa hhomc consumption and export 
that will nirc farm income and earn foreign 
= c b w .  
(6) The research teams that generaled 
Rchologier  for maize, tu. cotton and 
groue&~ucs were small a d  focused. An 
djaumm in the size of vlmc NARS both in 
researchers and maximize the productive use of 
scarce scientific resources. This means the 
crwtion of small but effective multidisciplinary 
research tcams. 
(7) Along the same lines, fewer but relevant 
commodities should be mandated to NARS. 
Research priorities should be identified, not by 
policy-makers or research directors alone, but 
with the full participation of researchers and 
farmers. Research priorities should be matched 
with realistic institutional and manpower 
capabilities. 
(8) Similar to determining research priorities. 
research thrusts should be developed and a 
balance between farming systems research and 
commodity research should be emphasized. It 
should be recognized that research may be 
location-specific. For example, while increases in 
sorghum and pearl millet production in the Sahel 
will come mainly from improved soil and water 
management technologies, in the more humid 
coastal zone, genetic crop improvement 
technologies will play a major role. 
(9) Given the limitation in indigenous 
researchers. NARS should focus on applied and 
adaptive research and no1 be unrealistic as to 
wander into strategic research although there may 
be major technical problems that require long. 
term strategic research. Establishing linkages 
with outside institutions is a beucr approach and 
several of the IARCs and international 
development agencies in Africa have a role lo 
play in this area. 
(10) lmprove the quality of existing staff 
through in-service training opportunities. 
Svengthen the institutional base of NARS through 
an expansion of personnel in higher education 
(research, training and extension) in order to 
speed up human capital development. 
(11) Identify, train and provide adquate 
leadership and managerial skills for NARS and 
deploy researchers to their appropriate m c  of
competence. 
(12) lmprove linkages between research 
imtiultes and univcrsitiea where often there are 
rul( wirh fundamentd knowledge in the nat lal  
sciences and sccio-economics. 
Ikinitirl mceess of lhefint two Inranatid 
Agricultural R-h ContlW, CIMMYT md 
p&ad ad nremeh aainat m y  be necenuy IRRl led to (hc emtion of more Cenuer. Sevaal 
h order to aeas a o r i h l  m u 8  of good of I~CJC VITA. ILEA. ILRAD lad WARDA) ~c 
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located in Africa as arc non-CG Centres like 
ICIPE and ICRAF. ICRISAT has recently 
established a regional sub-Centre in Nlamey. 
Niger and has two regional programmes, the Wea 
African Sorghum Improvement Programme 
(WASIP) and the SADCCllCRISAT regional 
pmgnmme for the improvement of sorghum and 
pearl millet. Both ClAT and ClMMYT also have 
Africa-based pmjccu. 
Although tk results of the activities of the 
lARCs in Africa are not as dramatic as those that 
triggered ClMMYT and IRRI's green revolution 
in Mexico and Asia, there have been considerable 
gains by African countries. The Nile Valley Faba 
Bean Reject, supported by ICARDA has led to 
the release of higher ylelding and dlscase-free 
bean varreties. In the Gambia, maize acreage 
tripled between 1982 and 1985 and was sustained 
as a result of the IITAJSAFGRAD effort in that 
country. Zimbabwe has found that varieties of 
sorghum and mlllet from ICRISAT's programmes 
in India and West Africa arc performing well in 
Initial adaptive trials of the SADCCllCRlSAT 
programme. The tremendous staff Improvement, 
both In numbers and qual~ty, in Mali's NARS, 
lnstitut d'economie rurale (IER) is the result of a 
long associauon between ICRISAT/USAID and 
IER. 
The lARCs came into existence because the 
NARS were unable to and incapable of meeting 
the challenges posed by focd shortages. Donors 
rallied around because governments were also 
unable to meet the challenge. However, the 
ultimate success of the IARCs will be measured 
by how much and lo what extent NARS 
themselves are able. In the long run, to 
successfully meet thls challenge and not 
necessarily on the volume of technology 
generated by the IARCs. This calls for equal 
partn'ership in the generation, adoption and 
dissemination of appropriate whnologies. The 
IARCs should: 
(1) Expand training programmes to provide 
opportunities for NARS researchas. especially 
mid-r scientists mpulicipatc inprofunional 
fellowship over p romted  periods of intensive 
learning by on-the-job expaience u the Centrca. 
(2) Provide in-country supp01-1 m NARS by 
posting experienced Centre staff for long 
assignments within existing national 
po&ramsr. Tbc ICRISAT-klrli Roprnmme is a 
~ . x r a p l c o f t h i r a r n u ~ . ~ r b o u l d i n v o l v e  
th6 of 2-3 Caam Nff in appropriate 
-.erpcirlly in brstQlDO ra4 apnomy 
to assist in conducting adaptive research. As 
distinct from expatriatesof bilateral donor-funded 
projects, these scientists receive good back- 
stopping from the Centres, stimulate NARS 
scientists, provide foreign exchange for urgent 
and important equipment and training. 
(3) Co-ordinate the different training 
programmes offered by lARCs to avoid 
duplication and overlap. Increase emphasis on 
short- to medium-term specialized training 
courses in specific disciplines. 
(4) Provide opportunities for degree training 
atthepnduatcIevel,espeeially fortheslsrescarch 
and cut down on general group courses. Then are 
several NARS with technicians butnorescarchers 
lo direct and supervise them. The African 
Regional Postgraduate Programme In Insect 
Science (ARPPIS) of ICIPE is already in the 
forefront in this area. 
( 5 )  Conduct strategic research that is of 
relevance to NARS and the sub-Sahara Afr~can 
region and ensure the particlpauon of NARS and 
involvement of farmers in the planning of research 
and in the transfer of technologies. 
Action by donors 
The lARCs cannot operate without suppofl 
from donors. Donors should: 
(1) Adoptasubregionalapproach andclassify 
NARS into categories based on their capabilities 
and potential. Within each sub-region, identify 
NARS with the greatest potential for development 
and assist them into a leadership role as  
technology generating NARS. 
(2) Assist NARS with programme reviews. 
reorganization, redesign and orientation, in order 
to increase their specific capacities. capabilities 
and productive efficiency. ISNAR's role in this 
activity is well recognized. 
(3) Streamline bilateral projecu, co-ordinate 
multi-donor funding, provide long-term funding 
(10-15 years), encourage longer duration of 
expatriate assistance, and integrate donor- 
assirtad research projccts into the national 
programme. 
(4) Inrim on counterpan funding (no matter 
how small), accountability and participation by 
M t i d  gDVmlmCnU. 
(5) Provide wpportlor training and alm msLt 
in devdoping r cdKlent long-turn amegy  Io 
ahif1 tbe a ~ n c  of postgraluare mining from 
hdu8tri.l woncrier to rclec(cd univmitiw in 
Africa whcre rctponribilitiw on a regional 
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c o n t u t m  apparont(e.g. University ofZimbabwe 
for southan Africa. University of Ahmadu Bello. 
Nigai .  for Sudano-Sahelian Wes( Africa). This 
would involve investment in improving the 
quality of faculty staff and research facilities in 
such univusities. In !he long run. it would pay-off 
when one realizes that the cost of overseas 
postgraduate mining in an industrialized country 
ranges between SSO,oOO-100.000. 
(6) Training should address all aspects of 
NARS, namely research, management and 
extension. Support for human resource 
Implicit in the sub-regional approach is the 
creation of regional research networks which 
reduce costs, minimize duplication, boost 
efficiency and fnvour the much-needed existence 
of a critical m a s  of professionals working in the 
same loution or project. Networks can be based 
on similar agroccological conditions, farming 
systems, research problems, priorities or 
strategies. The participatim of the IARCs and 
support by donors in regional networks is 
essential. But networks en for NARS and should 
be run by NARS. 
development should have along-term perrpccuvc 
~n view ofthe rao~d turnover of well-ua~ned staff CONCLUSIONS 
in !he region. 
(7) Assist in strengthening faculties of 
agriculture and related academic departments 
through affiliations with mentor tnstitutions and 
universities, assignment of faculty and exchange 
programmes, and development of postgraduate 
curricula. In the long run, these universities will 
be able to offer high-quality postgraduate 
programmes. 
(8) Assist in the development of effective 
regional information anddocumentation services. 
Thew is an urgent need for easy access by NARS 
scientists to scientific and technical information 
if they are to kccp abreast with the scientific 
world. Staff training in library science and the 
support of such libraries with adequate funding 
for the procurement of journals is particularly 
important. 
Joint action 
A sub-regional approach calls for 
collaboration betwccn governments and between 
NARS, co-operation with lARCs and support of 
donors. This will be parlicularly beneficial la 
countries where itwill be unreasonable toattempt 
to mount a full and independent agricultural 
research programme. While Larger and viable 
NARS will,morcand more,aetheresponsibility 
of generating appropriate technologics for thcir 
sub-regions, smaller NARS will have the 
wlvmmge of directly "borrowing" from a next 
door neighbw. 
When science and technology were mobilized 
to transform mditional agriculture into highly 
productive systems of farming and the concept of 
genotype/environment interactions was exploited 
to develop new crop varieties, especially wheat 
and rice, that took advanlage of improved levels 
of agronomic management, mankind once again 
ascertained his ability to enhance natural 
processes and speed-up evolution to the 
betterment of the human race. While in some 
countries, this phenomenal discovery was 
exploited and conditions created to provide 
scientists with opportunities to explore new 
frontiers in agricultural research, resulting in 
impressive gains in agricultural production, in 
SSA an actual decline in production is a shameful 
index of managerial incompetence and poor 
governance. 
The major constraint in SSA is the lack of the 
right attitudes in the highest levelsof the decision. 
making machinery to recognize the importance of 
agricultural research in the economic recovery, 
long-term progress and future prosperity of the 
region. This opinion is aptly supported by Dr. M. 
Toure of Senegal: "One of the reasons perceived 
(in the lack of genuine and effective political 
commivmnt IO research) in many counuies is the 
absence of a topnotch, unified, and cohsaive 
community at the political, sdministrative and 
scientific level who en convinced of the critical 
role of research in developmenl ..." (Pickcring. 
1988). 
The&& e v i d c ~ e  of wcceasful regional inra- Similarly, the green revolution that has 
nwernmcnml institutions in SSA. Sob-,b-nmonal vans fmed  rhe anriculNIsl ~roduction of Asia's 
k i t l~ t i cmr  q u k  & n g  pol i t id  unnmLrmcnt rice, whut  Md kiu m d  of Africa's large 
frcm the prnicipating governmenu and farm-holdera (Zimbabwe and Kenya) m y  not be 
investmenu shoold be mob*rc and complment appmprinle for the ma l l  fm-hokkr. Location- 
cmgoing programmes in order not to affect specifr tecbndogy for such Immn and making 
indiwp.1 C O M ~  progrpmmts. it poaribk f a  than IO prodw more through 
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clung- in price policies, ue key .reas in sub- 
S a h n  African ngriculture (Odhiambo, 1984: 
Doggctt. 1984). 
Almost 30 y w s  after independence some 
Africans .n still moaning over the c u m  of tbcir 
wiwial  heritage. India. which had been described 
as a hopeless caxc was feeding mOM of Asia and 
exporting technology to the rest of the developing 
world within the same time frame after 
independence. SSA must wake up to its wlf- 
imposed incompetence and inability to compete 
with Le  rest of the world in producing iw own 
food. There is a limit IO which we must continue 
to rely on the international community and must 
formulate policies that will stimulate the 
agricultural sector to achieve srable levels of 
production. African countries should dcvotc more 
effon to ensuring political stability, consistency 
in Leu  policies and allocation of resources on a 
continuous basis to agricultural research and 
developmen1 at levels commensurate with their 
declared priority of achieving self-reliance and 
food security (Okigbo. 1988). 
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